








The main idea in Ali Shariʿati’s mind when he was lecturing, writing, and debating 
in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s in the university of  Mashhad and in Husaynieh Ershad, 
Tehran, was not so different from Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: “the 
Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change 
it.ˮ1 Shariʿati was trying to convince his audience—young revolutionary students, 
Marxists, and others in Iran and in different countries of  the Middle East—that to 
overcome the condition of  backwardness, and to defeat capitalism and imperialism 
in their societies, one must be an organic intellectual and sway the masses to one’s 
side. To achieve this goal, one should establish a discourse focused on the deep tra-
dition of  Islamic thought in general and Shiite thought in particular. Shariʿati main-
tained that the main role of  a real revolutionary and organic thinker in Iran was to 
re-think, re-theorize, and re-construct Islam to return it to the way it was in its early 
phase. In other words, he wanted those seeking change to establish a revolutionary, 
socialist ideology that would liberate Muslims along with humankind in general. 
Dr. Ali Shariʿati was born in 1933 in a small village called Kahak, in Kho-
rasan, located in Northeastern Iran.2 His father was Muhammad Taghi Shariʿati, 
founder of  the Center for the Propagation of  Islamic Truths which aimed to dis-
seminate Islam through teachings of  logic and science. Its goal was to attract intel-
lectual and modernized youth back to faith and Islam, a goal destined to be one of  
the main objectives in young Shariʿati’s philosophy and activism.3 Shariʿati was a 
sociologist, an activist, and a graduate of  the Western Academy. During his studies 
in Paris, he was exposed to western revolutionary movements, Marxism, socialism, 
and existentialism, and he could foresee the shift of  Iranian and Shiite youth in pur-
suit of  these ideas. Shariʿati maintained that the Shiite faith should be renewed and 
transformed into a comprehensive revolutionary faith. He interpreted the Qur’an 
and Islam in modern and socialist terms, and depicted prophets as leaders of  op-
pressed populations around the world.4 A number of  skeptical clerics and support-
ers of  the Shah deemed Shariʿati a Marxist hiding behind Islamic terminology. By 
the early 1970s several major Shiite ulama, including Abul Qasim Khoei and Muham-
mad Husayn Tabatabaei, had issued religious rulings (fatwa) against Shariʿati, accus-
ing him of  heresy and opposition to Islam.5 
It is important at this stage to iterate that Shariʿati was a genuine Islamic 
thinker who strongly believed in the advantage of  the true Islam over any other 
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western ideology to mobilize the masses and to elevate them in the dialectical 
process of  moving from the mud to God. Shariʿati even insisted that Marxism has 
borrowed many of  its principles from the Islam and not the contrary. For example, 
he always stressed that the revolutionary asceticism is not something modern Mus-
lims have learned from Marxists, “It is the Marxists who have just learnt it from 
Islam.”6 
Shariʿati joined the National Front of  Iran, which included observant Shiʿa 
Muslims, secular nationalists, and Marxists who worked against the dominance of  
the Western powers over Iran and its natural resources.7 Together with his father 
and other clerics, Shariʿati joined the Movement of  God-Worshipping Socialists, 
founded by Muhammad Nakhshab; its name was taken from the title given by Shar-
iʿati to a translated biography of  one of  Prophet Muhammad’s companions, Abu 
Dharr al-Ghafari.8 The biography portrays him as a prototype of  the socialist hero: 
a revolutionary who opposed poverty, capitalism, feudalism, racism, and dictator-
ship, and who was considered to be a source of  inspiration for all revolutionaries 
worldwide, especially in the Middle East.9 In his life, Shariʿati admitted that he was 
a “follower of  Abu Dharr and that his Islam, Shiism, ideals, wants and even rage, 
were those of  Abu Dharr. Shariʿati felt so close to Abu Dharr that he felt himself  
something close to his reincarnation.”10 
In 1960, after completing his Master’s degree in foreign languages with 
specializations in Arabic and French, he was granted a state scholarship to the Sor-
bonne to study for a PhD in sociology. While in Paris, he joined the Iranian Student 
Confederation, the exiled branch of  the National Front of  Iran, and organized stu-
dent demonstrations on behalf  of  Algerian revolutionaries and nationalists. Shariʿati 
also edited two journals: Iran Azad, the organ of  the National Front in Europe, 
and Nameh-i Pars, the monthly journal of  the Iranian Student Confederation in 
France. Shariʿati also translated Che Guevara’s  Guerrilla Warfare  and Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s What Is Poetry? and began a translation of  Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of  the 
Earth and Year Five of  the Algerian Revolution (better known to English readers as A 
Dying Colonialism).11 
 Shariʿati’s sojourn in France had a considerable influence on his work. 
Throughout his studies he was in contact with the Algerian resistance movement, 
the National Liberation Front. He was also influenced by the French philosopher 
and activist Jean-Paul Sartre and by Frantz Fanon, a prominent theoretician of  rev-
olutionism in the Third World. In fact, Shariʿati attempted to take the revolutionary 
ideology he acquired in France through a process of  “Islamization” to render it 
more relevant and clearer to the Iranian masses, who did not necessarily know or 
comprehend Western worldviews, ideologies, or philosophies, but were strongly at-
tached to Islam and the Islamic tradition as an integral part of  their lives.  
In fact, this was a point of  disagreement between Shariʿati and Fanon dur-
ing their exchange of  ideas over the role of  religion in general and of  Islam in par-
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ticular in the broad anti-colonial war. While Fanon expressed his doubts about the 
role that religion would play within the international revolutionary front of  anti-
colonialism, Shariʿati was certain that in the case of  Islam, and especially in case of  
the Alvid Shiite Islam, it had a central role. This genuine form of  Islam has a rev-
olutionary ideology that enables the organic intellectual in Iran—and all Islamic 
countries—to fuse with his own society and not to be alienated from it.12 
Therefore, Shariʿati not only criticized traditional clerics or others who 
glorified passivity and intizar (awaiting), he also criticized “Westernized” Iranian in-
tellectuals who attempted to eliminate the clerics, Islam, and Islamic traditions, both 
progressive and reactionary.13 These latter intellectuals, he maintained, were inef-
fective in terms of  their struggle against Imperialism.14 In his lecture “Where Shall 
We Start” Shariʿati emphasizes this point: “Our own history and experience have 
demonstrated that whenever an enlightened person turns his back on religion, which 
is the dominant spirit of  the society, the society turns its back on him.”15 Thus, 
Shariʿati delineated a path for organic intellectuals in Iranian society, and in Islamic 
societies in general, whereby their activism should be driven by the predominant 
national faith of  these societies, and not exist separately from it.  
In 1964 Shariʿati returned to Iran. Upon his arrival, he was imprisoned 
for six months. After his release, he taught at a high school and later at Mashhad 
University. In 1967, he moved to Tehran and started to lecture at Hosseiniyeh Er-
shad, a religious institute founded and financed by veteran leaders of  the Liberation 
Movement. The next five years were the most productive in his life. He lectured 
regularly at the Hosseiniyeh, and most of  these lectures were transcribed into pam-
phlets and booklets. Along with the pamphlets and booklets, tapes of  his lectures 
were widely circulated and received instant acclaim, especially among college and 
high-school students.16 Soon after the closure of  the Hosseiniyeh, Shariʿati was ar-
rested and accused of  advocating “Islamic Marxism,” and subsequently imprisoned. 
He remained in prison until 1975, when a flood of  petitions from Paris intellectuals 
and Algerian government officials secured his release. On May 1977, he left for 
London, where only one month after his arrival he suddenly died. His death was 
attributed to the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK.17 
 
Religion against Religion 
The dialectical method which Shariʿati adopted from Marx and Hegel is explicit in 
most of  his writings and in the way he dealt with various social and religious phe-
nomena. In his search for the perfect revolutionary tool or party with which the 
masses in Iran, various Islamic countries, and the third world could reach emanci-
pation, he activated the dialectical method and negated the hegemonic religion, what 
he called black Islam or the Islam of  clergy, with red Islam or the Islam of  the mu-
jahid.  
Shariʿati directed his main criticism towards Muslim clerics who dedicated 
their energy to unnecessary details while abandoning the core of  true Islam, which 
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he believed to be social justice and resistance to oppressive powers. Shariʿati differ-
entiated between pure Shiʿa Islam—the revolutionary and authentic Islam of  Ali—
and the passive and inauthentic Safavid Shiʿa Islam.18 
 
Islam has two separate Islams. The first can be considered a rev-
olutionary ‘ideology.’ By this I mean beliefs, critical programmes 
and aspirations whose goal is human development. This is true 
religion. The second can be considered scholastic ‘knowledge.’ 
By this I mean philosophy, oratory, legal training and scriptural 
learning. Islam in the first sense belongs to the Mojaheds, Abu 
Zarr, and now the intelligentsia. Islam in the second sense be-
longs to the Mojtaheds, Abu Ali Sina, and the seminaries’ the-
ologians. The second form can be grasped by academic 
specialists, even by reactionary ones. The first can be grasped by 
uneducated believers. This is why sometimes true believers can 
understand Islam better than the faqih (religious jurist), the ʿ Alim 
(scholar) and the philosophers.19 
 
Shariʿati maintained that Shiʿa Islam had sided with the oppressed masses for many 
centuries, and sought to liberate them from various tyrants: 
 
We can see that for over eight centuries (until the Safavid era), 
Alavid Shi’ism was more than just a revolutionary movement in 
history which opposed all the autocratic and class-conscious 
regimes… Like a revolutionary party, Shi’ism had a well-orga-
nized, informed, deep-rooted and well-defined ideology, with 
clear-cut and definite slogans and a disciplined and well-groomed 
organization. It led the deprived and oppressed masses in their 
movements for freedom and for seeking justice.20 
 
Shariʿati was less concerned with the confrontation between secularism and Islam. 
Instead, he preached about the clash between the two Islams: between the red Alavid 
Islam, as he named it, and the black Safavid Islam.21 While red Islam praised mar-
tyrdom and revolutionary activism, the Safavids disempowered people, and trans-
formed the idea of  heroic activism of  Imam Husayn—the third Imam of  the 
Shi’a—into acts of  contrition, constant self-pity, passivity, and infinite waiting, which 
prevented believers from acting in a way that would change the status quo.22 Shariʿati 
aspired to a Shiʿism without clerics or, at least, without the kind of  traditional clerics 
who were mainly concerned with trivial issues. He sought to turn religion into ide-
ology that mobilized the masses towards revolutionary acts that would establish the 
empire of  justice in the world at the present, instead of  waiting until the end of  
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history in the far-distant future. 
By looking at all of  Shariʿati’s work we can see that the dialectical method 
with its thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis could be used to explain the general nature 
of  historical development.23 We can detect the same method in his efforts to re-
construct revolutionary Islam by advancing red Alavid Shiʿism against the traditional 
black Shiʿism in order to reestablish and revive the real prophetic Islam of  the 
prophet Muhammad, his companions, and his family.24 
Shariʿati’s critique of  so-called black Islam or black Shiʿism was not just a 
critique of  its spiritual-political message. It also highlighted Shi’ism’s economic 
structure as its main problem:  
 
Do you know what is the source of  misery for Islam? It is the 
formation of, and the dependency of  the religion on, [petit-bour-
geoisie] class, establishing [as they have,] a connection between 
the seminary and the bazaar. Should Islam to be able one day to 
get rid of  this dirty connection, it will, forever, assume the lead-
ership of  humanity; and should this relation continue, Islam has 
been lost forever. The Islam which is growing nowadays and 
which has adherents is the Islam with connection between Hajis 
[he means the merchants who have been to Mecca] and the Mol-
las. And these two have a [cozy set of] reciprocal relationships 
with each other. This [the Molla] takes care of  the other’s [the 
Haji’s] religion, and that [the Haji] takes care of  the other’s [the 
Molla’s] worldliness … then in [the process of] such a reciprocal 





We have to save Islam from this connection [between the mer-
chants and the clerics]. In my opinion, this is the objective. Ex-
cept for this commitment, with whatever we keep busying 
ourselves—good or evil, true or false—we have abandoned our 
responsibility and our mission.26 
 
The target of  Shariʿati’s criticism was not just the super-structure of  the Islamic 
system. He targeted not only the ideology on the surface of  the system, but also 
the root of  the economic system of  Iran and Islamic countries in general. Shariʿati 
attacked the charity system that enabled capitalists to accumulate wealth and then 
give up part of  it as an act of  charity to the poor. He argued that charity should be 
replaced by a system of  social justice, based on a different economic system, that 
has its basis in Islam: “The Islamic economic system should be such that he [the 
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capitalist] is not permitted to accumulate wealth.” He accused the clergy of  “ad-
monishing the capitalist on the pulpit, but [issuing] juridical injunctions in his 
favor.”27 In order to prove the genuine nature of  his socialist claim he quoted the 
Qur’an: 
 
And those who hoard gold and silver and spend it not in the 
way of  Allah—give them tidings of  a painful punishment. The 
Day when it will be heated in the fire of  Hell and seared there-
with will be their foreheads, their flanks, and their backs, [it will 
be said], ‘This is what you hoarded for yourselves, so taste 
what you used to hoard.’28 
 
Thus, Shariʿati’s Islam was a socialist one. He was certain that under a re-
structured, socialist Islam, the boundless accumulation of  capital would be pre-
vented. In order to do so, Islamic society should firmly adopt progressive programs. 
Later on, Shariʿati provided an Islamic metaphysical perspective in support of  these 
socialist and Marxist economic measures: 
 
In our eyes, bourgeoisie is loathsome. It will not just be elimi-
nated. It must be eliminated. This [capitalist system] is to be con-
demned not just because it is incompatible with the “collective 
production” in modern industrial systems, but more because it 
is antihuman. It corrupts the human nature. It transforms all val-
ues to interests. It changes the nature to “money,” and man, who 
is the representative of  God on earth … to a bloody wolf.29 
 
For Shariʿati there were no doubts that the system that should succeed this cor-
rupted capitalist system was a socialist one, which would emancipate humankind 
from economic and spiritual chains. This would allow individuals to realize their di-
vine origin and to be closer to God, in the sense that he talked about in his tawhid 
theory, which will be discussed later. And yet, after all these statements, it was 
nonetheless very important for Shariʿati to explain in what sense he was a socialist 
but not a Marxist: 
 
It is clear in what sense we are not Marxists, and in what sense 
we are socialists. As a universal and scientific principal [sic], Marx 
makes economics the infrastructure of  man; but we [hold] pre-
cisely the opposite [view]. That is why we are the enemy of  cap-
italism and hate the bourgeoisie. Our greatest hope in socialism 
is that in it man, his faith, ideas and ethical values are not super-
structural, are not the manufactured and produced goods of  eco-
nomic infrastructure. They are their own cause. Modes of  
production do not produce them. They are made between the 
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two hands of  ‘love’ and ‘consciousness.’ Man chooses, creates, 
and sustains himself.30 
 
In this context, I would agree with Mojtaba Mahdavi that socialism in Shariʿati’s 
view “is not simply a just system of  production and distribution, but also a philos-
ophy that guides everyday actions and contains an ethical dimension.”31 In Shariʿati’s 
view, socialism permits man to realize his divine origin and emancipate himself  
from the economic and spiritual prison of  capitalism. Therefore, socialism in Shar-
iʿati’s view is not a mere economic value of  collective appropriation of  the collective 
surplus-value. Rather, socialism functions as an emancipatory monotheist system 
which enables the man to be the closest to God. 
 
Shariʿati’s Organic Intellectual 
Shariʿati designated the main role of  disseminating this ethical dimension of  equality 
among the masses to intellectuals. He believed that intellectuals have a very impor-
tant role in leading the masses to the “light” of  true Islam as a combination of  
social justice, equality, freedom, and socialism. 
In dealing with the obstacles that confront intellectuals, Shariʿati sought 
to merge Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s idea of  the organic intellectual and 
Plato’s idea of  the pursuit of  truth. Gramsci made a significant contribution in mov-
ing the focus of  Marxist analysis from the economic dimension to the ethical, cul-
tural, and political one. He explains that the group which should formulate the main 
message of  the “general will” is the group of  intellectuals who are supposed to 
consolidate the current “historical bloc” struggling to promote a new hegemonic 
political project. According to Gramsci, an intellectual and ethical leadership would 
formulate a more exalted synthesis, which the ideology helps transform into an or-
ganizational mortar that consolidates a “historical bloc.”32 Gramsci defines the in-
tellectual not as a truth pursuer in the Platonic/Socratic sense but distinguishes 
between two types of  intellectuals: “organic” versus “traditional.” He maintains that 
the organic intellectual is part of  the 
 
social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of  an 
essential function in the world of  economic production, [that] 
creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of  in-
tellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of  its 
own function not only in the economic but also in the social and 
political fields…33 
 
The neo-Gramscians have developed this definition of  the organic intellectual to 
include intellectuals from any social group, and not only the ones who emerged 
from the world of  economic production.34 
Just as in Gramsci’s theory of  hegemony, Shariʿati shifted the question of  
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oppression in Iran from domination (i.e. coercion) to leading (i.e. coercion and con-
sent). He believed that the formulation of  radical Islamic ideology was the first and 
most important step towards effecting social change. This is the main task of  the 
intellectuals, who should be involved in a long “trench war” to enable them to gain 
gradual control over all positions in this great battlefield—to instill the alternative 
hegemony in the society, which in Shariʿati’s case is Alavid (red) Shiite Islam. Ac-
cording to Gwyn Williams, in his classical essay on the Gramscian concept of  hege-
mony, a project becomes hegemonic when its “concept of  reality is diffused 
throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with 
its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social 
relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation.”35 This is exactly 
what Shariʿati sought to achieve with his Alavid revolutionary Islam. 
Shariʿati accentuated the role of  the conscious vanguard intellectual in 
changing the destiny of  his own society. He argued that “a conscious and alert in-
dividual could grab history by the collar and propel it from feudalism to socialism, 
thus disrupting the orderly historical stages of  development and historical deter-
minism.”36 Indeed, Shariʿati believed that the role the intellectual should play in the 
countries of  the third world is to enlighten the masses. He should fulfill his mission 
by being part of  these masses and by merging with them, using their language and 
basing his arguments, slogans, and program upon their own understanding: 
 
In a society like Iran, whose foundation is a religious one, we 
must not turn ourselves into a so-called free-thinker cadre (that 
gathers in coffee houses, cabarets, and parties to “talk big,” and 
show off  by reciting new personalities), while our average citi-
zens are still living in the Middle Ages, having no access to our 




Any school which is not based upon the cultural foundations of  
a society looks like a good book in a library which is used only 
by a small group of  students and professors. Even if  thousands 
of  such books are printed, they will have no effect upon the 
masses. The greatest danger, however, is self-separation of  the 
free-thinker from the society’s context.38 
 
It is not enough for intellectuals, from his perspective, to be “right” or to offer a 
brilliant analysis of  reality. Their challenge is to connect with the masses in order 
to transform their poverty into consciousness that would lead to action. As Shariʿati 
put it: “contradiction must enter subjectivity in order to cause movement. This is 
why poverty does not cause movement, it is the feeling of  poverty that does … 
The poor must develop consciousness of  poverty.39”At the same time, Shariʿati did 
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not believe that “free-thinkers” should continue to lead the masses after the revo-
lution succeeds, unless they are totally merged in an evolutionary action. Rather, 
Shari’ati preferred that another type of  intellectual, referred to as revolutionaries, 
would take the lead. He maintained that after the free-thinkers light the spark, it 
will be time for revolutionaries to step in: 
 
Therefore, the function of  free-thinkers is not the political lead-
ership of  a society, rather, their sole job is to bestow awareness 
on the masses, that’s all. If  a freethinker yearns to awaken his so-
ciety, the product of  his mission will be heroes who can lead the 
free-thinkers themselves.40 
 
And he continues after this statement: 
 
As long as there are no heroes, the mission of  the freethinker is 
not yet over. Religion, art, how to communicate with people, po-
etry, and theatre are all important factors with which free-
thinkers can work; trying to handle more than these is useless. 
That is, the mission of  a free-thinker is confined to returning the 
alienated society (by Europeans) to her real self, restoring her 
character and her “usurped” human sentiment and bestowing 
class consciousness, faith, and national history upon her.41 
 
Shariʿati believed that the “true spirit of  Iran’s history” is Islam, and in order for 
the organic intellectual to be truly “organic,” he needed to find the real revolutionary 
impulse with in Islam and not outside it.42 That was exactly what Shariʿati did by 
reviving and reframing Islam as a revolutionary ideology. 
 
Consciousness Revolution: Leaping to the Twentieth Century 
Shariʿati maintained that Iran and countries of  the Islamic world should undergo a 
process of  self-invention and rediscovery. Through this process of  rediscovery, Iran 
and the Islamic countries would break free from their imperialist and colonial op-
pressors in the West and enter the twentieth century as productive agents. At the 
same time, Shariʿati believed that Islam should undergo a reformation like the one 
that Catholic Christianity went through in the sixteenth century. “He evaluated the 
Protestant movement through which a new religion was founded as a positive West-
ern experience worthy of  emulation.”43 Shariʿati called for the transformation of  
Islam and its purification from practices and rituals foreign to true Islam. 
As part of  his understanding of  history, Shariʿati believed that to attain 
the revolutionary phase, and to move towards the fulfillment of  the Marxist pre-
diction of  a classless and just society, Iran and the Islamic countries should first go 
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through a revolution of  consciousness. As Shariʿati’s wife put it: “For Shariʿati, the 
task of  revolutionary intellectuals was to develop a contextually grounded discourse 
of  revolutionary awareness on the basis of  the ‘extraction,’ ‘reformation,’ and ‘re-
finement’ of  local and popular cultural resources.”44 Shariʿati did not maintain that 
Iran and other colonialized and semi-colonialized countries—especially in the Is-
lamic world—should wait for the next stage of  development. Rather, he believed 
that with the right investment and the right revolutionary consciousness, Iran could 
pass in one or two decades through several stages that had taken the west hundreds 
of  years: “If  we recognize that we are in the 14th century and subsequently work 
with our society with 14th century methods, we will reach the 20th century in less 
than half  a century.”45 
Shariʿati did not dismiss the relevance of  a Marxist analysis for Islamic 
countries, yet he was certain that for a Marxist analysis to be relevant, it should 
come after the conscious revolution or in parallel to it, not instead of  it. For Shar-
iʿati, this was the principle error that had been committed by Marxists and socialists 
in the Islamic countries, and in Iran in particular, for a long time—they imposed an 
analysis relevant to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on a context of  the four-
teenth century. For him, these Marxists and socialists were akin to traditional Islamic 
clerics; specifically, they were fanatical about the literal word of  Marxism rather than 
the dialectical understanding of  its spirit. 
 
Shariʿati’s Marx 
Shariʿati was a Marxist in his own way, even if  he did not admit it. As Hamid 
Dabashi puts it: 
 
A close reading of  Shariʿati’s writings leaves no doubt that his 
chief  frame of  reference, his conceptions of  history, society, 
class, state apparatus, economy, culture, his program of  political 
action, his strategies of  revolutionary propaganda are all in the 
classical Marxist tradition.46 
 
For Shariʿati, as he explained in his lectures entitled “Lessons on Islamology,” there 
was not one Marx, but three: the young philosopher Marx, the mature social-scien-
tist Marx, and the old political Marx. Shariʿati rejected the young and the old Marx 
and adopted only the middle, sociologist Marx.47 For Shariʿati, the young Marx was 
mainly an atheist who did not differentiate between the institute of  the church and 
the essence of  true religion. Shariʿati tried to fix the “mistake” of  the young Marx 
through his aforementioned theory of  differentiation between the two religions 
that exist within each religion, especially within Islam: the religion of  the oppressors 
and the religion of  the oppressed. Shariʿati approved of  Marx’s critique of  religion 
as the “opium of  the people,” and he defended Marx’s statement as true insofar as 
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we examine the past and present of  institutionalized religion, rather than the religion 
of  action.48 He writes: 
 
As for religion, Marx saw resemblance between the complexion 
of  Jesus and the Pope’s; this is where he was mistaken! The 
Pope’s complexion was closer to the Roman Caesar’s rather than 
to Jesus Christ’s, the barefoot Palestinian fisherman, crowned 
with thorns … One does not refer here, neither to the 19th cen-
tury’s Pope nor to the institution of  the Catholic Church, but to 
the capitalist clerics who used to dominate the people’s faiths 
throughout history and in all societies, taking advantage of  this 
to instill their unjust rule that makes the majority a victim of  the 
“nobility” of  the ruling minority. For this reason, Marx adopted 
materialism as an ideological basis for the socialist system, calling 
for denying religion that constitutes an ideological basis for the 
hegemony of  the nobles and the tyrant government…49 
 
Thus, Shariʿati’s critique of  Iranian Marxists, and secular intellectuals’ way 
of  dealing with religion was based on Marxist thought itself. Shari’ati’s critique had 
two distinct bases. On the one hand, his first critique focused on an analysis of  the 
specific historical context that Marx addressed in his writing and theory; on the 
other hand, his second critique focused on an application of  Marxist ideas in the 
different context of  twentieth century Iran:  
 
The value of  Marx’s philosophy resides in his pursuit of  knowl-
edge regarding the movement he belonged to, and the sacred 
goal that he believed in and sought to analyze deeply. Marx wrote 
history in favor of  this movement, and enriched it with reason, 
philosophy, economics, sociology and anthropology, and pro-
vided the proletariat, that he was committed to, with class con-
sciousness, and with the ideological weapon that helped it 
survive. Therefore, scientific and ideological imitation does not 
mean that we have to repeat Marx’s deeds unconsciously and 
adopt his way of  thinking blindfolded.50 
 
Furthermore, Shariʿati never used the loaded Islamic term Kufr (blasphemy) to de-
scribe Marx and Marxism—unlike his contemporary clergies. He argued that, al-
though he is not materialist, many materialists—including Marx—are much closer 
to God and to the real Islam than the traditional clerics who did not defy the rulers 
and the oppressors: “examine carefully how the Qur’an uses the term Kafer. It uses 
that term to describe those who refuse to take action for the truth. It never applies 
that term to those who deny the existence of  God and the soul.51 Shariʿati main-
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tained elsewhere that Islam’s contradiction with imperialism and capitalism was an-
tagonistic incapable of  reconciliation, while Islam’s contradiction with Marxism was 
of  non-antagonistic nature. For Shariʿati, Marxists were rivals while the imperialist 
camp was an enemy.52 
As for the old Marx, he was a political figure who made mistakes in his 
short-term political and economic predictions. For Shariʿati, the most effective 
Marx, the one that should be adopted and learned from, was the middle-period so-
ciologist who analyzed the history of  humankind, theorized the antagonistic class 
struggle, and posited the determinism that is moving humankind towards social jus-
tice. As we shall see later, Shariʿati took this phase of  Marx and merged it with his 
own theory of  tawhid. He also tried to merge historical determinism with God’s will, 
which he submitted to an existentialist interpretation. 
 
Revolutionizing Islam: Tawhid  and Revolutionary Action 
As previously stated, Shariʿati was deeply influenced by European Marxism and ex-
istentialism, and tried to merge Islam and Marxist philosophy in a way that was ac-
ceptable to and based on the Islamic tradition and faith in Iran or, as he maintains: 
  
Adherence to real faith and “Tashayuʿ” (Shiism) in our society 
unites us with the masses, and enables us to speak in their lan-
guage, hence our ability to disseminate consciousness and instill 
a sense of  responsibility (among the masses) … this is achieved 
through interpreting and analyzing events and figures in the his-
tory of  Islam. This adherence rescues us from being alienated 
from people (al-nas), and builds between us, namely the intellec-
tuals and the masses, a stable bridge. Therefore, consciousness 
regarding the “Tashayuʿ” becomes a general conception in the 
society we live in, since it helps us understand genuine and deep 
truths in our land.53 
 
Shariʿati had a twofold purpose. In addition to mobilizing the masses towards rev-
olutionary activism, he adhered to his father’s original objective voiced years earlier: 
to attract the westernized Iranian intelligentsia back to Islam. To achieve this, he 
needed to use one of  the central worldviews that prevailed in Europe at that time, 
in addition to Marxism: Sartrian existentialism, which constituted a common infra-
structure and language that was shared amongst the Iranian intellectuals that were 
influenced by it during those years.54 
In her 2014 article, researcher Elisheva Machlis emphasizes Shariʿati and 
tawhid theory—the monotheistic principle of  unity—writing that he succeeded in 
formulating an authentic theory that linked Islam to existentialism. He achieved this 
mainly by transforming tawhid  from an Islamic theological perception into an ide-
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ology and worldview of  revolutionary activism that seeks to change reality.55 That 
is to say, he sought to position human beings and their future at the centre of  con-
cern, instead of  divine essence and nature. 
In his unique perception of  the tawhid  concept Shariʿati merged God, na-
ture, and humankind, rendering them one essence. In his lecture on tawhid  he writes 
that “there are many people who believe in tawhid, but only as a religious-philosoph-
ical theory, meaning nothing but ‘God is one, not more than one̓ but I take tawhid 
in the sense of  a world-view, and I am convinced that Islam also intends it in this 
sense.”56 
 
A paragraph earlier he writes:  
 
But tawhid as a world-view in the sense I intend in my theory 
means regarding the whole universe as a unity, instead of  dividing 
it into this world and the hereafter, the natural and the supernat-
ural, substance and meaning, spirit and body. It means regarding 
the whole of  existence as a single form, a single living and con-
scious organism, possessing will, intelligence, feeling and pur-
pose.57 
 
Shariʿati’s tawhid theory was meant to bridge divine authority, human activism, and 
freedom of  choice, which ultimately lead to humankind’s freedom of  political ac-
tivity in this world, here and now, as an alternative to the passivity that “black 
Shiʿism” promoted. This is made possible by virtue of  the inherent unity between 
God, humankind, and nature, and in light of  Shariʿati’s renewed interpretation of  
man’s perception as “God’s Caliphate,” or God’s successor on earth. Therefore, 
Shariʿati concludes that God and humankind are part of  one entity; as a result, hu-
mankind constantly progresses in an infinite path—for God is infinite—towards 
the comprehension of  the universe and of  God, which will enable one to act freely 
in this world, and to be responsible for his choices and deeds.58 
Using the dialectical method, Shariʿati referred to human beings as a union 
of  two opposites: thesis which is the “spirit of  God” and anti-thesis which is the 
“stinking mud” from which human beings were made. The struggle between these 
two contradictory elements created the dialectical movement from the “stinking 
mud” to “God” and this journey was called, in Shariʿati’s jargon, religion.59 In Shar-
iʿati’s interpretation, tawhid is also the rejection of  any kind of  polytheism in the 
political, economic, and social spheres. Shariʿati’s tawhid symbolized humankind’s 
liberation from submission to any social force or power that may be other than 
God. It meant also the rebellion against all earthly powers which sought submission, 
wishing to replace the position of  God.60 In this sense, Shariʿati’s tawhid theory—
contrary to that of  black Islam or the traditional clergy—had very stark social, po-
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litical, economic, and ethical implications similar to those of  its pure version in the 
era of  the prophet Muhammad and his companions, especially Ali and Abu Dharr 
al-Ghafarri. The desired result of  Shariʿati’s tawhid philosophy is not an ideological 
or intellectual exercise for its own sake; instead, Shariʿati’s activism was committed 
to achieving justice through authentic Islamic instruments, even at the expense of  
Orientalizing western ideologies (which he admitted) and “westernizing” Islam 
(which he did not admit). 
What interested Shariʿati was not merely the afterlife. He was motivated 
to change the present world that people currently live in and suffer in as human be-
ings: 
…this is the tashayuʿ, it is not about praying in a hope of  gaining 
hur al-ʿein [the heaven’s beautiful virgins]. The real tashayuʿ is not 
about accumulating “requitals” (thawab) in preparation for the 
afterlife; it is about gaining requital and all the good in this world. 
It seeks to achieve salvation, “divine interceding” and all the 
goals that exist on earth…it even builds heaven in this world.61 
 
Shariʿati further emphasized the goal of  achieving social justice. In order to do so, 
he gave a new, revolutionary reading of  the Qur’an. He maintained that the Qur’anic 
references to Allah on social issues can in fact be replaced with al-nas (the people): 
 
In the affairs of  society, therefore, in all that concerns the social 
system, but not in creedal matters such as the order of  the cos-
mos, the words al-nas and Allah belong together. Thus when it is 
said, “Rule belongs to God” the meaning is that rule belongs to 
the people, not to those who present themselves as the repre-
sentatives or the sons of  God…When it is said, “property be-
longs to God,” the meaning is that capital belongs to the people 
as whole, not to Croesus. When it is said “religion belongs to 
God” the meaning is that the entire structure and content of  re-
ligion belongs to the people; it is not a monopoly held by a cer- 
tain institution or certain people…62 
 
As these quotes demonstrate, Shariʿati’s perception was radical and humanistic. Al-
though he was not an orthodox Marxist, he was deeply influenced by Marx. In ad-
dition to the argument voiced by many scholars who maintain that Shariʿati brought 
Marxism and revolutionary perceptions into a process of  “Islamization,” I think it 
is very important to add that Shariʿati also re-constructed Islamic thought and 
brought it into a process of  social revolutionization.63 For example, in his lecture 
on the dialectics of  sociology, Shariʿati reduced social structures and regimes in his-
tory to two models: Abel’s and Cain’s. These are “monotheist” tawhidi regimes and 
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the “polytheist” shirk regimes, linking the Marxist analysis of  the different socio-
economic phases of  human history, with the Qur’anic and Islamic (and other Abra-
hamic religions’) story of  the sons of  Adam. In Abel’s regimes Shariʿati includes 
egalitarian social structures, primitive communism in early history, and the future 
socialist and subsequent communist classless society, whereas in Cain’s regimes, he 
includes all social structures based on oppression and exploitation such as slavery, 
feudalism, capitalism, and so forth.64 
Within these regimes, Shariʿati distinguishes two opposing forces: the ex-
ploiters and the exploited. Among the former he includes kings, capitalists, imperi-
alists, aristocrats, and traditional clerics; in the latter he includes the people, or al-nas, 
and God. Shariʿati emphasizes that, in a class-based society, “Allah sides with al-nas 
in all the social issues mentioned in the Qur’an. Allah and al-nas are actually syn-
onyms, and very often they can replace each other without changing the meaning.”65  
Shariʿati emphasized that “Islam invites the individual who wishes to experience 
God to annihilate or negate himself  in the people or the creatures of  God.”66 There-
fore, Shariʿati replaced the Sufi concept of  self-annihilation and subsequent assim-
ilation or living in God with self-annihilation and subsequent assimilation or living 
in the people.67 This was a very revolutionary idea that made Marxist revolutionaries, 
such as Che Guevara who merged with the masses, closer to God than the clerics 
who separated themselves from the people and their struggle against imperialism, 
capitalism, and injustice.  
Shariʿati’s interpretation of  the story of  Cain and Abel in the Qur’an is 
completely Marxist. He maintained that the only reason for the differences between 
Cain, the oppressor, and Abel, the oppressed, was economic structure and their dif-
ferent positions in the relations of  production. He emphasized that they both came 
from the same father and the same mother, they both lived in the same “society” 
and in the same environment, and they both had the same education and cultural 
background.68 The reason for their different reactions to their father’s request, that 
each of  them would marry the other’s twin sister, was a result of  their different 
place in the relations of  production “Abel represented the pasture-based economy, 
of  primitive socialism that preceded private ownership, and Cain represents the sys-
tem of  agriculture, and individual or monopoly ownership.”69 
 
A few sentences later Shariʿati states: 
 
In my opinion, the murder of  Abel at the hands of  Cain repre-
sents a great development, a sudden swerve in the course of  his-
tory, the most important event to have occurred in all human 
life. It interprets and explains that event in a most profound fash-
ion—scientifically, sociologically, and with reference to class. The 
story concerns the end of  primitive communism, the disappear-
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ance of  man’s original system of  equality and brotherhood, ex-
pressed in the hunting and fishing system of  productivity 
(equated with Abel), and its replacement by agricultural produc-
tion, the creation of  private ownership, the formation of  the first 
class society, the system of  discrimination and exploitation, the 
worship of  wealth and lack of  true faith, the beginning of  en-
mity, rivalry, greed, plunder, slavery and fratricide (equated with  
Cain).70 
 
At the end of  the story, Shariʿati underlined the lesson that we should learn from 
this symbolic story: 
 
This confirms the scientific fact that life, society and history are 
based on contradiction and struggle, and that contrary to the be-
lief  of  the idealists, the fundamental factors in all three are eco-
nomic and sexuality, which come to predominate over religious 
faith, brotherly ties, truth and morality.71 
 
Shariʿati surpassed other contemporary clerics and philosophers. He tried to match 
Shiite Alavid Islam, as he names it, to revolutionism to transform it into an instru-
ment that can change the world and confront the local capitalists and imperialists, 
and their allies, the Safavid clerics, without causing alienation of  the masses.  
 
Conclusion: Revolutionism between Islam and Socialism 
Ali Shariʿati’s writings and thoughts represented the atmosphere that prevailed 
among a gradually growing group within the Shiite community in different countries, 
mainly among radical youth who sought change. However, these young radicals 
were uncertain about the best way to create far-reaching social transformation that 
would improve their condition and that of  their families and communities. In the 
period of  widespread agitation from the 1950s to the 1970s, an era of  national lib-
eration and decolonization movements in the Third World with an increasing num-
ber of  young people following radical and socialist ideologies and views, it seemed 
that religious ones in general, and the Muslim Shiʿa in particular, became obsolete 
institutions that disconnected themselves from young people’s lives. At that time, 
Shiite clerics were a sort of  prototype of  the traditional intellectuals that Gramsci 
referred to in his Prison Notebooks, in the sense that they were a kind of  a remnant, 
who adhered to the past and to the very limited knowledge that served as sedative 
for the masses. These clerics continuously supported passivity and intizar (awaiting) 
on the part of  believers: abstention from taking any activist initiative in this world 
to change the reality in which the Shiite believers live, or to confront the injustice 
they have been subject to for centuries.  
Shariʿati emerged during this precarious time, deriving support from the 
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early history of  Shiʿa Islam, which he perceived as much more active, including the 
early contemplations of  the first Imam, Ali, and the third Imam, Husayn. Shariʿati’s 
thought could not have originated without this historical development, during which 
radical, socialist, and patriotic perceptions were deeply instilled in Middle Eastern 
counties and in Iran in particular. Shariʿati was an organic intellectual, in Gramsci’s 
sense, not only because he was the product of  a specific socioeconomic class, but 
also because he established an organic relationship with the populations that sup-
ported him and his approach, and because of  his responsiveness to the challenges 
that other radical movements put in his path. 
More precisely, Shariʿati can be characterized as a religious intellectual who 
evolved organically and was in dialogue with tradition. His traditionalism—in this 
case not in its Gramscian sense—derives from his refusal to totally detach from the 
religion. At the same time, he extracted from that tradition the revolutionary-resis-
tive parts that Shiʿism, especially early Shiʿism, is saturated with. Shariʿati recon-
nected Shiite emblems and tradition to the daily life of  believers, transforming them 
into a powerful political stimulus that enabled the Shiites to draw from both worlds. 
Passivity and abstention from political activism were not needed anymore in the 
present condition. On the contrary, believers needed to be active and lead all op-
pressed people worldwide through means that were both authentic and rebellious.  
Shariʿati’s Islamic-socialism was shaped to give an answer to concrete 
challenges that confronted revolutionaries and Marxists in an Islamic country, 
where religion played a very crucial role in the popular tradition of  the masses. 
Instead of  throwing the entire tradition away and causing alienation among the 
masses, he decided to take the progressive part of  that tradition and religion, 
and to criticize its reactionary representatives, especially clerics, in their own 
field (religion): he strove to re-invent a genuinely progressive Islam. He con-
currently fought orthodox Marxists on their own ground (historical-materialist 
theory), arguing in favour of  applying what he saw as the spirit of  Marxism as 
opposed to its orthodox dogma—exactly the same methodological split he saw 
with respect to religion. By adapting Marxist theory to present conditions, in a 
way that would not be foreign to the masses or alienated from them, namely by 
synthesizing it with their lived experience and worldview—predominantly 
Islam—one can achieve the goal for which this philosophy was invented in the first 
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